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Das Wichtigste in Kürze
In vielen Ländern spielt das Berufsausbildungssystem eine wichtige Rolle für den Übergang
von Schulabgängern in den Arbeitsmarkt. Trotz der Bedeutsamkeit des Ausbildungsab-
schlusses sind Abbrüche häufig: in Deutschland brechen über 20 Prozent der Auszubilden-
den die Ausbildung vorzeitig ab. Frühe Abbrüche sind dabei vorherrschend — die Hälfte
aller Abbrüche geschieht innerhalb des ersten Ausbildungsjahres, ein Drittel während der
Probezeit.
Im Jahr 2008 hat die Deutsche Bundesregierung den Ausbildungsbonus eingeführt, um
benachteiligte Jugendliche zu unterstützen. Der Ausbildungsbonus soll ihnen helfen, einen
Ausbildungsplatz zu finden und einen Ausbildungsabschluss zu erlangen. Nur Jugendliche,
die nach dem Schulabschluss mindestens ein Jahr lang erfolglos nach einem Ausbildungs-
platz gesucht haben, können gefördert werden. Das Programm bietet eine Subvention von
4.000 bis 6.000 € für Unternehmen, die einem förderfähigen Jugendlichen einen Ausbil-
dungsplatz anbieten. Die zweiteilige Subvention wird nach Abschluss der Probezeit und
nach Bestehen der Abschlussprüfung ausgezahlt.
Die Subvention durch den Ausbildungsbonus verringert die Lohnkosten der geförder-
ten Auszubildenden substanziell. Unternehmen können die Subvention mit den geförderten
Auszubildenden teilen, indem sie ihnen höhere Löhne zahlen, oder indem sie einen nicht-
monetären Transfer herstellen. Ein nichtmonetärer Transfer kann beispielsweise in besserer
Beratung und Anleitung, mehr Geduld und Entgegenkommen, Ermunterung und Unter-
stützung gegenüber den geförderten Auszubildenden oder besseren Arbeitsbedingungen
bestehen. Wenn die Subvention zwischen Unternehmen und geförderten Auszubildenden
aufgeteilt wird, kann die Förderung durch den Ausbildungsbonus Ausbildungsabbrüche
reduzieren.
Wir untersuchen, ob der Ausbildungsbonus Ausbildungsabbrüche bei benachteiligten
Jugendliche reduziert. Um den Effekt des Programms zu identifizieren, vergleichen wir frü-
he Abbruchraten von Auszubildenden, die durch den Ausbildungsbonus gefördert werden,
mit förderfähigen aber tatsächlich ungeförderten Auszubildenden. Wir verwenden detail-
lierte Daten mit umfassenden Informationen über beide Gruppen von Auszubildenden.
Umfang und Qualität des Datensatzes rechtfertigen die Annahme, dass selektive Maßnah-
menteilnahme in den Daten vollständig beobachtbar ist.
Unter Verwendung von Propensity Score Matching finden wir keinen signifikanten
Effekt des Ausbildungsbonus auf monatliche Abbruchraten innerhalb der ersten 12 Monate
der Ausbildung. Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass eine subventionierte Berufsausbildung den
Ausbildungsabbruch nicht beeinflusst. Jedoch passt das zeitliche Muster der Effekte auf die
monatlichen Abbruchraten zur Anreizstruktur des Ausbildungsbonus. Die Punktschätzer
sind in den ersten vier Monaten negativ, nach denen die erste Zahlung der Subvention
erfolgt. Danach werden die Punktschätzer positiv. Dies legt die Vermutung nahe, dass
der Ausbildungsbonus während der Probezeit im Ansatz einen dämpfenden Einfluss auf
Ausbildungsabbrüche hat.
Non-technical summary
In many countries, apprenticeship training plays a major role for school leavers to enter
the labour market. Despite the importance of the apprenticeship degree, dropout of ap-
prenticeship training is frequent: in Germany more than 20 per cent of apprentices drop
out before the end of training. Early dropout is prevalent, as about half of all dropouts
occur during the first year of apprenticeship training, and one third occur during the first
four months (i.e. during the probationary period).
In 2008, the German Federal Government introduced the Apprenticeship Bonus to
support disadvantaged young people. The Apprenticeship Bonus should help them to
find an apprenticeship position and to obtain the degree. Only young people who have
unsuccessfully searched for apprenticeship positions after leaving school for at least one
year are eligible for Apprenticeship Bonus. The programme provides a 4,000 to 6,000 €
subsidy to firms who offer a position to an eligible apprenticeship seeker. The two-part
payment is conditional on completing the probationary period and on completing the final
exam.
The subsidy provided by the Apprenticeship Bonus decreases labour costs of entitled
apprentices by a substantial share. It can be shared with apprentices by higher wages, or
firms could pass non-monetary transfers to subsidised apprentices. Non-monetary trans-
fers can comprise, for example, more guidance, higher commitment, more patience and
concessions, more encouragement and support towards the apprentice, or better working
conditions. If the rent is shared between the firm and the apprentice we expect the subsidy
to reduce dropout from apprenticeship training.
We investigate whether the Apprenticeship Bonus is an effective measure to reduce
dropout of apprenticeship training for disadvantaged apprentices. In order to identify the
effect of the programme, we compare early dropout rates of apprentices subsidised by
Apprenticeship Bonus with eligible but unsubsidised apprentices. We use detailed survey
data containing extensive information on both groups of apprentices. The amount and
quality of our data justify an evaluation approach that is based on selection on observables
in order to control for selective programme participation.
Using propensity score matching, we find no significant effects of Apprenticeship Bo-
nus on monthly dropout rates during the first 12 months of apprenticeship training. Our
findings state that subsidised vocational training is ineffective in decreasing dropout. How-
ever, the time pattern of the insignificant effects fits the incentive structure provided by
the Apprenticeship Bonus. Estimates are negative in the first four months, when the first
payment is transferred after completing the probationary period. Estimates turn posit-
ive afterwards. This suggests that during the probationary period there is a notion of a
favourable impact of Apprenticeship Bonus on dropout risk.
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1 Introduction
In many countries, apprenticeship training plays a major role for skill formation during
school-to-work transition (Ryan, 2001). About two thirds of German school leavers, in
particular those who finish lower or intermediate secondary schooling, enter the labour
market via the apprenticeship system (BMBF, 2010). Finishing apprenticeship training
leads to a formal degree that certifies the acquisition of vocational qualification in form
of work experience and specific skills. In Germany, this formal degree often serves as
an “admission ticket” for future jobs, and unemployment rates are high for workers who
did not finish apprenticeship training successfully. Accordingly, in many cases dropout of
apprenticeship will affect future career prospects (Winkelmann, 1996; Lüdemann et al.,
2006; Oreopoulos, 2007). Despite the importance of the apprenticeship degree, dropout
of apprenticeship training is frequent. For example, in Germany more than 20 per cent of
apprentices drop out before the end of training (see Table 1). Early dropout is prevalent;
approximately half of the dropouts occurs during the first year of apprenticeship training,
and one third occurs during probationary period. Apprenticeship training in Germany
takes between 2 and 3.5 years.
Table 1: Dropout rates for apprenticeship training in Germany
Dropout rate in
first year of
apprenticeship
Dropout rate in
probationary
period/first 3
months
Overall dropout
rate
2001 0.12 0.06 0.24
2002 0.12 0.06 0.24
2003 0.11 0.06 0.22
2004 0.09 0.05 0.21
2005 0.09 0.05 0.20
2006 0.09 0.05 0.20
2007 0.09 0.05 -
2008 0.11 0.07 0.21
2009 0.12 0.07 0.23
2010 0.12 0.08 0.23
2011 0.13 0.08 0.24
Source: German Federal Institute for Vocational Education
and Training (BiBB). No data available for 2007.
In 2008, the German Federal Government introduced the Apprenticeship Bonus1, a
programme that aims to support disadvantaged young people. The Apprenticeship Bonus
should help the eligible group to find an apprenticeship position and to obtain the formal
degree of a qualified worker. Only young people who have searched without success for an
apprenticeship position to start training after leaving school are eligible for an Appren-
1Apprenticeship Bonus denotes the German programme Ausbildungsbonus.
1
ticeship Bonus.2 The programme provides a 4,000 to 6,000 € subsidy to employers who
employ an eligible apprenticeship seeker. The employer has to meet additional conditions
in order to get the subsidy, which is split into two equal payments. The first payment is
conditional on the apprentice’s completion of the probationary period, which is typically
three to four months after the start of apprenticeship training. The second payment is
conditional on the registration of the apprentice for final examination, which is typically
two to three months before the end of the training period.
We investigate whether the Apprenticeship Bonus is an effective measure to reduce dro-
pout of apprenticeship training for disadvantaged apprentices. First, we analyse charac-
teristics of eligible apprentices in order to assess whether they are actually disadvantaged.
In the main part, we estimate the effect of participation in Apprenticeship Bonus on dro-
pout during the first year of apprenticeship training. In order to identify the effect of the
programme, we compare early dropout rates of apprentices subsidised by Apprenticeship
Bonus with eligible but unsubsidised apprentices.
This study is closely related to research on the effect of subsidised employment, dropout
of education, and the effect of subsidies on educational attainment. To our knowledge, this
is the first study evaluating the effect of a subsidy on dropout for apprenticeship training.
In classical evaluation studies, dealing with the effect of subsidies on employment duration
or employment probability, the typical outcome is non-subsidised regular employment.
Gerfin et al. (2005), Jaenichen and Stephan (2011) and Göbel (2006, 2008), for example,
examine the impact of subsidised employment on the probability of prospective regular
employment, considering subsidised employment as non-desirable. Accordingly, Bell et al.
(1999) and Dorsett (2006) evaluate the British program New Deal for Young People with
respect to the employability of subsidised youth.
In contrast, the Apprenticeship Bonus has the explicit goal to prevent dropout from
subsidised apprenticeship training. In our case, the subsidy aims to reduce dropout from
apprenticeship training. Staying in apprenticeship training until the final examination is
considered desirable since completion of apprenticeship training serves as an important
signal to future employers. Evaluation studies on subsidised apprenticeship training are
rare. A related study by Dettmann and Günther (2009) analyses the effect of subsid-
ised vocational training on employment opportunities after the end of the training for
East Germany. Using a matching approach, they conclude that subsidised apprentices
are negatively discriminated in finding adequate employment after the end of vocational
training.
Our study shares traits with the vast literature on the determinants for dropout of
schooling, post-compulsory schooling, or apprenticeship training. Bessey and Backes-
Gellner (2008), for example, provide evidence on the determinants for dropout of voca-
tional training in Germany. Furthermore, there is literature on the effects of subsidies on
educational attainment. Dynarski (2003), for example, evaluates the effects of a subsidy
2Young people who cannot finish apprenticeship training because the firm goes bankrupt are eligible
for Apprenticeship Bonus, too. This case is not studied here.
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for college students on the probability of college attendance and completion in the US.
The study shows that schooling attendance and completion are positively affected by the
subsidy. Dearden et al. (2009) evaluate the impact of means-tested grants for students on
retention in post compulsory education in the UK. The grant has a significant positive
impact on the participation rate at the beginning of post compulsory education and one
year later. Though, these studies evaluate subsidies that are paid directly to the students
or their parents.
The German apprenticeship system is a dual track system, and apprentices work in
the firm most of the time and spend one to two days per week at vocational schools, where
they follow specific and general classes. Private firms play an important role. They provide
most of the vocational training and therefore bear most of the costs. Firms consequently
expect to receive the lion’s share of the returns from apprenticeship. Their returns to ap-
prenticeship training depend on the productivity of apprentices, the time the apprentices
work in the firm and the supply of qualified workers at the labour market. Profit maxim-
ising firms can be expected to decide over the course of apprenticeship training whether to
continue apprenticeship training or dismiss the worker by considering expected costs and
returns. As an incentive for private firms to hire and to train apprentices, policy makers
tend to pay subsidies for training costs (compare Becker, 1962; Wolter and Ryan, 2011).
The subsidy provided by the Apprenticeship Bonus decreases labour costs of entitled
apprentices by a substantial share. As the payment of the Apprenticeship Bonus is split
into two parts, ceteris paribus the subsidy provides an incentive for firms to prevent the
entitled apprentices from dropping out. The subsidy can either be shared with apprentices
by higher wages, or firms could pass non-monetary transfers to subsidised apprentices.
Non-monetary transfers can comprise, for example, more guidance, higher commitment,
more patience and concessions, more encouragement and support towards the apprentice,
or better working conditions. If the rent, provided by the subsidy, is shared between the
firm and the apprentice or if the firms put forth extra effort in order to receive the subsidy,
then we expect the subsidy to reduce dropout from apprenticeship training.
For the empirical analysis, we use detailed survey data on apprentices to evaluate the
effect of Apprenticeship Bonus on early dropout. The data contain extensive informa-
tion on apprentices who are subsidised by Apprenticeship Bonus and apprentices who are
eligible for the programme but not subsidised. We use detailed information on appren-
tices’ characteristics such as education, socio-economic and family background. The data
also comprise information on apprentice’s behaviour, activities and decisions for the time
between leaving school and start of apprenticeship training. The latter includes the search
strategy in order to find an apprenticeship position between leaving school and starting
apprenticeship. We argue that amount and quality of our data justify an evaluation ap-
proach that is based on selection on observables in order to control for selective programme
participation.
Using propensity score matching, we find no significant effects of Apprenticeship Bonus
on monthly dropout rates during the first 12 months of apprenticeship training. Still, the
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time pattern of the insignificant differences between monthly dropout rates fits the incent-
ive structure provided by the Apprenticeship Bonus. The estimates suggest that dropout
rates are slightly decreased by the Apprenticeship Bonus during the first four months
after the start of apprenticeship. After the fourth month, the Apprenticeship Bonus has
a tendency towards higher dropout risk. Apparently, the Apprenticeship Bonus decreases
the dropout rates insignificantly until the end of the probationary period, when the first
payment takes place. Once firms have received the first payment of the Apprenticeship
Bonus, the dropout rates increase, and one year after the start of apprenticeship training,
the survival rates with and without the programme are roughly the same. Our find-
ings suggest that subsidising vocational training is ineffective in decreasing total dropout.
Overall dropout is not reduced 12 months after the start of vocational training.
The study is structured as follows: In Section 2, we briefly introduce the German
apprenticeship system and describe the mechanism of Apprenticeship Bonus regarding
dropout risk. The used data set and a descriptive analysis of the characteristics of ap-
prentices that are subsidised by Apprenticeship Bonus or unsubsidised but still eligible
are presented in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the identification strategy and refers to
potential factors relevant for dropout risk. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Apprenticeship Bonus
The German apprenticeship system has a long tradition in training young school leavers
to enter the labour market.3 Compared to many other countries, Germany faces relat-
ively low unemployment rates for young people, and labour market integration of school
leavers works well. Therefore, in the economic literature, the German apprenticeship sys-
tem is often considered as exemplary for other countries as well (Oulton and Steedman,
1994; Steedman, 2001; Harhoff and Kane, 1997; Wolter and Ryan, 2011). The German
educational system offers several alternatives to school leavers at the end of compulsory
schooling. Apprenticeship training is one important option besides university or direct
entry into the labour market. About two thirds of German school leavers enter the ap-
prenticeship system4, and for most of them apprenticeship training is a stepping stone
into the labour market.
After leaving compulsory school, the young people can apply at firms for apprenticeship
training without further prerequisites. Apprenticeship training lasts from two to three
and a half years.5 At the end of apprenticeship training, there is a central examination
of practical and theoretical professional knowledge and skills. For school leavers with
low degrees, the apprenticeship system offers an opportunity to get profound professional
3See (Franz and Soskice, 1995) for an overview. Some other countries like Switzerland, Austria and
Denmark have apprenticeship systems that are similar to the German system.
4In 2009, 64.8 per cent of German school leavers enter the apprenticeship system (BMBF, 2010).
5The duration of apprenticeship training depends on occupation and the previously obtained school
degree or vocational degree of the apprentice. Higher school degrees reduce the duration of apprenticeship
by about one year. Formally, the apprenticeship duration takes 18 to 42 months.
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training. On the other hand, non-completion of apprenticeship can hamper future career
prospects. For example, Lüdemann et al. (2006) report shorter unemployment duration
for workers who successfully finish apprenticeship training compared to workers without
complete apprenticeship training. Winkelmann (1996) also finds favourable employment
prospects of apprentices regarding the first full-time employment. Recent figures show
that 22 per cent of workers without a vocational training degree or university degree are
unemployed. In contrast, only 7 per cent of workers with vocational degree are unemployed
(IAB, 2011).
The theoretical part of apprenticeship training is provided by public vocational schools
for one to two days per week.6 For the other days, apprentices are trained on the job.
Thus, an important part of apprenticeship training is provided by the firm. In the course
of apprenticeship training, apprentices actually work in the firm and gain working ex-
perience. The relationship between the apprentice and the firm is therefore comparable
to the relationship normal employees have with their employer, apart from the fact that
apprentices earn less and spend part of the time at the vocational school. In larger firms,
specific instructors are assigned to support apprentices. As for regular employment, the
match quality between the apprentice and the firm is important for the stability of the
position.
In July 2008, the German Federal Parliament introduced the Apprenticeship Bonus7 as
a programme for disadvantaged young people. The Apprenticeship Bonus has two main
goals: first, to facilitate young people‘s access to apprenticeship positions and second,
to stabilise apprenticeship training for entitled apprentices. The Apprenticeship Bonus
offers a subsidy, paid to the employer for a newly hired apprentice under the following
conditions: First, apprentices have to “prove” that they have unsuccessfully searched
for an apprenticeship position after leaving school. Either they provide evidence that
they applied unsuccessfully for an apprenticeship position at least three times, or they are
officially registered as “searching for apprenticeship position” at the unemployment office.8
Besides this eligibility criterion on the individual level, there is a second additionality
criterion for the firm. To obtain the subsidy, the provided apprenticeship position has to
be “additional”. The additionality is legally defined as the number of offered apprenticeship
positions that has to be higher than the average number of apprenticeship positions offered
during the last three years.9
6We distinguish three types of apprenticeship training schemes in the German apprenticeship system:
A combination of schooling and in-firm training in the private sector, a combination of schooling and
in-firm training in the public sector, and training that is provided full-time by vocational schools. Since
the Apprenticeship Bonus is only provided for the private sector, we focus on the first scheme. To start
apprenticeship training at private sector firms, people have to apply for an apprenticeship position directly
at the firm.
7The Ausbildungsbonus is regulated by § 421r of the German Social Security Code III.
8Apprenticeship Bonus can also be provided for slow learners, socially deprived, or apprentices who
suffer from firm closure. This study, however, focuses only on workers who have unsuccessfully searched
for a position after leaving school.
9Since many firms fulfil this criterion anyway, it is apparent that it can not ensure that the subsidised
apprenticeship position is created as a result of the Apprenticeship Bonus.
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The Apprenticeship Bonus has direct implications for cost-benefit considerations made
by the firms. Depending on how much of the Apprenticeship Bonus is shared with the
apprentice, the subsidy lowers the labour costs and hence the net costs of employing an
apprentice for the firm. The total amount of the subsidy can be 4,000, 5,000, or 6,000 €,
depending on the monthly wage in the first year of apprenticeship training.10 With respect
to gross labour costs of apprenticeship, the amount of subsidy is substantial. Wenzelmann
et al. (2009) report that the average labour costs of training per apprentice are about
9,500 € per year. For three years of apprenticeship training, the subsidy reduces labour
costs substantially, as shown in Table 2.
Table 2: Amount of subsidies by Apprenticeship Bonus with respect to labour costs
amount of
subsidy
paid for monthly
wages
reduction of
labour costs *
4,000 € < 500 € > 22 %
5,000 € 500 – 750 € 18 – 28 %
6,000 € > 750 € < 22 %
* Average labour costs calculated over an assumed apprenticeship duration of three years.
Apprenticeship Bonus is divided into two equal payments. The first payment is con-
ditional on finishing the probationary period, which ranges by law from one to maximal
four months after the start of apprenticeship. The second payment is conditional on the
registration of the apprentice for final exams. Registration for the final exam is typically
two to four months before the end of the apprenticeship training. As the Apprenticeship
Bonus is split into two payments, firms ceteris paribus have an incentive to prevent sub-
sidised apprentices from dropping out before receiving the payments. If firms react to
this incentive, subsidised apprentices should be less likely to drop out than comparable
unsubsidised apprentices.11
Apprenticeship wages are quasi fixed by collective bargaining agreements, and the sub-
sidy is paid directly to the firms. Nevertheless, profit maximising firms are able to share
the rent via non-monetary transfers to the subsidised apprentices. To prevent dropout,
firms could for example pass on incentives to subsidised apprentices through higher com-
mitment, more patience, concessions, and encouragement, or providing better working
conditions. Despite fixed apprenticeship wages there is evidence that the subsidy could
also be passed on to apprentices by higher wages. In our survey we asked apprentices why
they dropped out of apprenticeship. Significantly less subsidised apprentices compared to
the unsubsidised apprentices state that the reason was a too low wage. Non-monetary
reasons like working hours or conflicts with colleagues or supervisors do not differ between
10The subsidy amount is 4,000 € if first year monthly wage is not more than 500 €; 5,000 € if first year
monthly wage is between 500 and 750 €; and 6,000 € if first year monthly wage is equal to or more than
750 €.
11After dropping out, the apprentice can not take the Apprenticeship Bonus to another firm. With a
new firm that is willing to hire him, the application procedure has to be passed anew.
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subsidised and unsubsidised apprentices.12
Firms bear net costs of apprenticeship training and take most of the benefits. As
apprentices work during apprenticeship training, they account for a certain part of firms’
production outcome. However, apprentices are less productive than comparable skilled
workers, which is reflected by lower wages.13 Nonetheless, specific firms actually choose to
train apprentices when they face substantial costs when labour market imperfections after
apprenticeship lead to restricted mobility of workers and therefore allow firms to collect
returns of investments into training (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998, 1999). As Wolter and
Ryan (2011) point out, subsidising training costs offers incentives for firms to hire and
train apprentices.
From a study of the implementation of the programme (BMAS, 2010) we have insight
into the selection process associated with Apprenticeship Bonus. This analysis indicates
that selection into Apprenticeship Bonus is to some extent driven by firms. Simultaneously
to or before hiring, many firms look out for possible programmes which offer financial or
other support in association with an apprenticeship position. As the provision of an
apprenticeship position is of public interest, support is often provided by public facilities,
and most firms are aware that disadvantaged youths are eligible to be funded by public
means. Accordingly, descriptive evidence from our survey indicates that apprentices are in
general not aware of the fact that they are actually subsidised by the Apprenticeship Bonus.
Only 30 per cent of the subsidised apprentices know about the programme Apprenticeship
Bonus.
As subsidies are likely to increase hiring of apprentices, they typically entail low util-
isation and substantial deadweight losses (Katz, 1998). When subsidies for training costs
are poorly targeted, firms might be seduced to take the payment and displace unsubsidised
training positions. The payments for apprenticeship positions which would also be offered
without the subsidy are deadweight losses (compare Wolter and Ryan, 2011).14
3 Data description
Our analysis is based on comprehensive survey data that were specifically collected for
this study between October and December 2009. The survey was conducted by telephone
interviews among 4,000 apprentices who have unsuccessfully searched for an apprenticeship
12In the literature some evidence for – mostly downward – discrimination in apprenticeship wages can
be found. Muehlemann et al. (2013) find that having fewer competitors for skilled workers is related with
lower pay for trainees on the establishment level. Ryan et al. (2013) examine cross-country evidence on
metalworking apprentices’ pay from on-site interviews with managers. They also suggest that besides
union power the supply of potential trainees can be an influencing factor on apprentice pay. Mohrenweiser
et al. (2011) suggest that employers could pay higher apprenticeship wages to avoid poaching.
13In fact, empirical evidence regarding net costs of apprenticeship training is ambiguous. Based on
a questionnaire, Wolter and Schweri (2002) report varying cost-benefit structures during apprenticeship
training for Switzerland. Mohrenweiser and Zwick (2009) find evidence for net costs in German firms
only in manufacturing occupations. Schönfeld et al. (2010) also report substantial net costs mainly in
manufacturing occupations.
14Another shortcoming of apprenticeship subsidies can be stigmatisation of the apprentices, making it
harder to find employment after the end of the subsidised training period.
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position at the end of schooling and who have been hired as an apprentice at least one
year after leaving school. Contact addresses of these apprentices were randomly drawn
from administrative data by the Federal Employment Agency.
Our sample contains a treatment group of 800 apprentices who are subsidised by the
Apprenticeship Bonus. We compare those subsidised apprentices to 3,200 unsubsidised
apprentices. Participants as well as non-participants have all been unsuccessfully search-
ing for an apprenticeship position after the end of schooling.15 All apprentices in the
sample, subsidised as well as unsubsidised, are eligible for Apprenticeship Bonus. Beyond
eligibility, the fact that 70 per cent of subsidised apprentices do not know that they are
promoted by Apprenticeship Bonus adds even more randomisation to our analysis. This
ensures from the outset that subsidised and unsubsidised apprentices are comparable with
respect to promotion by Apprenticeship Bonus, which is important for the assessment of
apprenticeship dropout in Section 4. Although selectivity can not be ruled out, this setup
is favorable for the analysis of the effect of Apprenticeship Bonus.
Subsidised and unsubsidised apprentices likewise started their apprenticeship in au-
tumn 2008, typically in September. Our sample of apprentices allows to compute results
for the population of German apprentices who were unsuccessfully searching an appren-
ticeship position after schooling and found an apprenticeship position only later.16
We have comprehensive individual information to characterise subsidised and unsub-
sidised apprentices. Firstly, the data contain educational and social characteristics as well
as the economic background of apprentices. School performance is measured by the highest
obtained degree and by school grades in the last school year. We proxy the socio-economic
background by the migration status, by questions on financial or psychological problems
and by welfare recipience status.
To convey a broad picture of apprentices who enter apprenticeship at least one year
after leaving school, the data comprise detailed information on activities of apprentices for
the time between leaving school and entering apprenticeship training, including informa-
tion on job search behaviour and biographical information for this period. This includes
self assessed reasons why school leavers have originally been unsuccessful in finding an
apprenticeship position and the time they spent until finding a position. The apprentices’
search effort is reflected by the number of applications they wrote and the number of job
interviews they obtained. We also have information on the job search channels they used
and how they finally found their apprenticeship position.
The following paragraphs describe important characteristics of apprentices who have
unsuccessfully searched for an apprenticeship position after the end of school and who
have been hired as an apprentice one year after leaving school or later. Although both
groups, subsidised and unsubsidised apprentices, can be considered as being disadvantaged
15Throughout the paper we refer to the group of non-participants with the short term “unsubsidised
apprentices”. Any deviation from this will be indicated in the text.
16The data were drawn from the population with respect to selected stratification variables: sex, migra-
tion status, firm size, and region. All results in this study are weighted in order to obtain results for the
underlying population.
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compared to apprentices who found a position immediately after school, we find some dif-
ferences between subsidised and eligible but unsubsidised apprentices. In the following,
we depict mean values for characteristics of subsidised and eligible but unsubsidised ap-
prentices in Table 5.
In our survey we ask why the apprentices did not start an apprenticeship immediately
after the end of schooling. The comparison of means between subsidised and unsubsid-
ised apprentices in our sample shows no significant difference: About the same share of
apprentices in the treatment and the comparison group stated their applications were not
successful (48 per cent compared to 46 per cent). Participants as well as non-participants
provide virtually the same explanations for this: another applicant was favoured, grades
were not good enough, or they were too late with applications. The fraction of the vari-
ous reasons why applications were not successful does not differ between subsidised and
unsubsidised apprentices.
A further reason that apprentices did not find an apprenticeship after leaving school
could be inability or lack of skills. Firstly, our data contain variables on secondary school
attainment. On average, we find significantly more subsidised apprentices with a lower
secondary degree (53 per cent compared to 34 per cent).17 The share of subsidised ap-
prentices with a middle or upper secondary degree is significantly lower, respectively (37
per cent to 42 per cent with a middle secondary degree and 7 per cent to 21 per cent with
a upper secondary degree). Subsidised apprentices therefore have on average a lower de-
gree than apprentices in the comparison group. Secondly, we also have measures of school
performance, measured by grades in the last school year. Subsidised apprentices have on
average worse grades in German (3.03 compared to 2.90).18 On the other hand, we do
not find a significant difference in Maths grades between subsidised apprentices and the
comparison group. Overall, our measures on school performance do not provide evidence
for one group being more disadvantaged than the other.
Besides educational attainment, socio-economic factors and family background can also
influence the individual decision not to take up apprenticeship training immediately after
leaving school. Among subsidised apprentices there are significantly more migrants (12
per cent to 9 per cent). Subsidised apprentices are more likely to have financial problems
or debts before they enter apprenticeship training. But they are less likely to suffer from
psychological or addiction problems compared to unsubsidised apprentices.
Search effort serves as an indicator for motivation, which is likely to influence the
success of applications in terms of actual job interviews. We find differences between
subsidised and unsubsidised apprentices with respect to both the number of applications
and the number of job interviews before school leavers found an apprenticeship position.
On average, subsidised apprentices report 35.6 applications. Unsubsidised apprentices
have written significantly more applications (42.1). On the other hand, the average num-
17A lower secondary degree contains nine or ten years of schooling.
18The German school grade system is represented by a scale reaching from 1 (very good) to 6 (unsatis-
factory).
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ber of job interviews is significantly lower for subsidised apprentices (5.9 job interviews
compared to 6.7). Fewer applications by the subsidised apprentices can reflect positive
selection: they stopped writing further applications when they found an apprenticeship
position.
The biography of apprentices can shed light on the question why applicants do not enter
apprenticeship training immediately after leaving school. Subsidised apprentices start
their apprenticeship on average 32 months after leaving school, which is significantly later
than unsubsidised apprentices (28 months). After leaving compulsory school, subsidised
apprentices are more likely to choose further schooling or enter evening classes (9 per cent).
They are also more likely to enroll in vocational schools (40 per cent).19 We do not find
significant differences between subsidised and unsubsidised apprentices in the likelihood
to enter active labour market programmes between school and start of apprenticeship.20
Subsidised and unsubsidised apprentices also do not differ in their biography in terms of
completing longer internships or staying for more than four weeks on holiday or abroad.
We investigate whether subsidized and unsubsidized apprentices differ on average in
their chosen professional occupation. As we stated in Section 2, costs of apprenticeship
differ substantially across occupations. Thus, it could be that the likelihood to receive
Apprenticeship Bonus varies across professional occupations and industries. We compare
the most frequent occupations chosen among the groups of subsidised and unsubsidised
apprentices. Table 4 shows no distinct differences between the treatment and comparison
group. Despite some changing in the order of occupations, we find the same occupations
among the five most chosen occupations in both groups. In addition, there is no particular
concentration on a certain occupation within both groups and the shares of each occupation
within subsidised and eligible unsubsidised apprentices are similar. Apprenticeship Bonus
seems not to be a matter of occupation.
Lastly, we also have information on the apprentices’ destination of dropout. One could
argue that dropout of apprenticeship is an economically efficient behaviour and preventing
apprenticeship dropout would be an inefficient measure. In this respect, dropout would be
efficient if the destination of dropout provided an alternative opportunity for a youth to
succeed on the labour market immediately and in the long run. Table 7 provides evidence
of the status after three, six and twelves months since apprenticeship has started for all
apprentices who dropped out until then. We differentiate between the status working,
unemployed, further education or (alternative) military service, and no relation to labour
market. For all three time points, apprentices who drop out until then mainly state that
they are unemployed afterwards. Specifically, twelve months after start of apprenticeship
54 percent of all subsidised apprentices who dropped and 40 percent of all unsubsidised
apprentices who dropped out are unemployed. From this evidence, we infer that dro-
pout of apprenticeship is mainly not an alternative opportunity for youth. Therefore, the
19Vocational schools or Berufsfachschulen in Germany are typically full-time, where pupils have the
possibility to earn a qualifying vocational degree.
20See figures for basic vocational year, basic training, job preparing training, job application training,
occupational orientation courses, and temporary extra courses in Table 5.
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prevention of dropout from apprenticeship in this respect can be regarded as a positive
outcome.
In summary, we find differences between the group of subsidised apprentices and un-
subsidised apprentices with respect to their educational and socioeconomical character-
istics and their search behaviour. These differences, however, give a mixed picture. The
figures do not suggest that apprentices subsidised by Apprenticehsip Bonus are generally
more disadvantaged than unsubsidised apprentices who are also eligible for Apprenticeship
Bonus.
4 The effect of Apprenticeship Bonus on early apprentice-
ship dropout
This section analyses descriptive statistics on dropout of apprenticeship and estimates the
causal effect of the Apprenticeship Bonus on early dropout. In Section 4.1, we present
descriptive evidence on dropout of apprenticeship in our sample. Further, we introduce
how we measure dropout rates as our outcome variable. Section 4.2 discusses identific-
ation of the causal effect of Apprenticeship Bonus and the fulfilment of the conditional
independence assumption. Section 4.3 states how the matching estimator is specified, and
section 4.4 discusses the estimation results.
4.1 Descriptive statistics on apprenticeship dropout
Ceteris paribus, apprentices who are subsidised by Apprenticeship Bonus should be less
likely to drop out. This is the case since firms have an incentive to prevent apprentices
from dropping out as they only receive the subsidy in the course of apprenticeship. The
first payment is conditional on survival of the probationary period and the second payment
is conditional on enrolment for the final exams towards the end of apprenticeship training.
The descriptive statistics in Table 8 indeed show that dropout due to the firm’s de-
cision occurs less frequently among the group of subsidised apprentices. 22 per cent of
subsidised apprentices state that the firm dissolved the apprenticeship contract.21 This is
a significantly lower share than that of the unsubsidised group, where 32 per cent report
that dropout occurs due to the firm’s decision.
Considering reasons for dropout, we find significant differences between subsidised
and unsubsidised apprentices. Table 9 presents different reasons for dropout, which are
reported by subsidised and unsubsidised apprentices who actually dropped out of appren-
ticeship. The two most important reasons for dropout are that the occupation did not
meet the expectations of the apprentices and that they had personal problems with their
colleagues or supervisors. Both reasons do not differ significantly between the group of
subsidised and unsubsidised apprentices. Differences in the reported reasons for dropout
can be found with respect to general health problems or low earnings. Health problems
21This information was surveyed in November 2009, i.e. about 14 months after start of apprenticeship.
11
that not due to apprenticeship which lead to dropout more frequently among unsubsidised
apprentices. Dropout due to low wages has been especially reported by unsubsidised ap-
prentices. 11 per cent state this reason compared to only 3 per cent among the subsidised
apprentices.
For our empirical analysis we measure apprenticeship dropout rates for every month t
since start of apprenticeship training. Since we have individual dropout data, we construct
the share of apprentices who dropped out in each month since apprenticeship started.
Dropout rates for month t denote apprentices who dropped out until month t as a fraction
of all apprentices who started in month t = 0. We study early dropout rates between the
first and the twelfth month since start of apprenticeship.22 This allows us to investigate
the impact of the first payment of Apprenticeship Bonus, which takes place at the end of
the probationary period, typically three months after the start of apprenticeship training,
on dropout risk.
Figure 2 shows unconditional Kaplan-Meier survival functions for the first twelve
months after the start of apprenticeship training. During the whole period, survival
rates for subsidised apprentices are higher than those for unsubsidised apprentices. For
every month since the start of apprenticeship there is a higher share among the subsid-
ised apprentices who remains in apprenticeship compared to the unsubsidised apprentices.
Monthly hazard rates in 3 indicate that monthly drop out rates are notably higher for
unsubsidised apprentices. This is in line with the argument that subsidised firms ceteris
paribus have an incentive to prevent dropouts, if only until the first payment takes place,
which is typically after three months. For the time after the first payment took place,
we observe rather higher monthly hazard rates for subsidised apprentices as compared to
unsubsidised apprentices. In this period, Apprenticeship Bonus provides no payment and
the second payment is still far-off. As a consequence, the incentive to prevent dropout
diminishes. After twelve months of apprenticeship, 13 percent of apprentices dropped out
of apprenticeship in the group of unsubsidised apprentices. Comparably, for the group of
subsidised apprentices the drop out rate is 14 percent.
4.2 Identification strategy
As we are interested in the causal effect of participation in the Apprenticeship Bonus on
dropout, we compute the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) (compare Rubin,
1974)
∆ATT = E(Y 1|D = 1)− E(Y 0|D = 1). (1)
Apprentices can be in two treatment states: Either D = 1 if the apprentice participates
in the Apprenticeship Bonus, or D = 0 if the apprentice does not participate. Y is the
monthly dropout rate: Y 1 denotes the outcome for the case of participation and Y 0 denotes
the outcome for the case of non-participation. Equation 1 defines the average treatment
22Data on late dropout is not available so far.
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effect on the treated as the difference between the average outcome of apprentices who
have participated in Apprenticeship Bonus and their average outcome if they had not
participated. The second term in Equation 1 is a counterfactual term and can therefore
not be observed in the data.
In order to estimate the effect of the Apprenticeship Bonus on dropout risk, we use a
matching estimator that relies on selection on observables. Equation 1 can then be written
as
∆ATT = E(Y 1|X,D = 1)− E(Y 0|X,D = 1). (2)
in which observables X enter the conditioning set of the expected values of Y 0 and
Y 1. We estimate the counterfactual term E(Y 0|X,D = 1) using the average outcome of
comparable unsubsidised apprentices E(Y 0|X,D = 0). We assume mean independence
between participation in Apprenticeship Bonus and the outcome for the case of non-
participation Y 0 conditional on observable characteristics X, i.e. E(Y 0|X,D = 1) =
E(Y 0|X,D = 0). This weaker version of the conditional independence assumption, which
does not require independence between treatment status and the outcome of both the
participants and the non-participants, is sufficient as we estimate treatment effects on the
treated only.
To fulfil conditional mean independence, all factors that influence both participation in
Apprenticeship Bonus and dropout risk need to be observed in order to estimate the causal
effect of the Apprenticeship Bonus. As mentioned in Section 3 our sample is restricted
to apprentices who were not successful in finding an apprenticeship position immediately
after leaving school but after one year or later. The apprentices in our sample are therefore
either subsidised by Apprenticeship Bonus or eligible for Apprenticeship Bonus but not
subsidised.
In order to identify the effect of Apprenticeship Bonus on dropout we consider the
influencing factors which are referred by the literature on the determinants of dropout. We
particularly refer to studies that consider dropout of apprenticeship, although such studies
are rare. We further consider the literature on dropout of post-compulsory education.
Apprentices and students in post-compulsory education are to some extent comparable as
both face the decision whether to invest further in education or to enter the labour market
directly.
Recent empirical literature on dropout identifies various relevant individual and social
background factors. Bradley and Lenton (2007) show evidence for the relevance of ethnic,
migrational and other socio-economic factors in explaining dropout of post-compulsory
education in the UK. They find that youths with ethnic minority background are less
likely to dropout of post-compulsory education. The authors also show that youths who
live in social housing – an indicator for low household income – are more likely to dropout.
The study also reveals that parental occupation matters for the propensity to dropout.
Youths with parents in professional or managerial occupations are less likely to dropout,
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which could be an indication for an income effect, or at least a taste-for-education effect.
In our analysis, we control for individual characteristics like gender, age, and migra-
tional status. An apprentice is classified migrant when he or she is born outside Germany
or both parents are born outside Germany. We account for the social background by
several variables. First, the parents’ educational degree is reported. Second, we have in-
formation on the number of books at home when the apprentices are at the age of 15. This
variable is a well known predictor for the households financial situation as well as the cul-
tural and social capacity of household members.23 Other indicators for household income
and the social background of apprentices at the age of 15 we control for are whether the
household has separate bedrooms for children, a personal computer, a car, or a garden.
To display the taste-for-education, we use the parental involvement in schooling – proxied
by the fact that parents show up regularly at parent-teacher conferences. This represents
the parents’ support concerning their children’s education and their encouragement.
The risk to dropout of apprenticeship can be related to the standard human capital
model by Becker (1964). Dropout of education or dropout of apprenticeship can occur due
to a change in the ratio of expected returns to education as compared to associated costs.
In our case, individual expected returns could turn lower than costs during apprenticeship
and thus lead to dropout of apprenticeship. In this respect, Bradley and Lenton (2007)
mention three theoretical reasons for dropout of post-compulsory education which should
also be considered in the case of apprenticeship. First, apprentices could perceive that
they have reached their optimal amount of education. Second, apprentices could have
underestimated costs associated with apprenticeship, or could have overestimated their
returns to apprenticeship. Third, dropout could also arise from non-pecuniar costs, for
example psychological or social problems.
We are not able to fully consider individual allocations and perceptions of expected
returns and costs of education. But we provide variables which proxy some of the non-
pecuniar costs of apprenticeship training. Our survey includes information on health,
psychological or addiction problems of apprentices. We also know whether apprentices
have to care for sick or old family members. We further control for the commuting time
to the firm and whether apprentices have a driver’s license as a further non-pecuniar
cost category. The information whether apprentices have a side job, which could reflect
opportunity costs, is also included.
A further reason for dropout of apprenticeship may be the match quality between em-
ployers and apprentices which can be linked to the concept of job match between employers
and employees by Jovanovic (1979). The model could serve as a rationale in our context
although it is not fully applicable. The author assumes two-sided information imperfec-
tion. At job entrance, both the worker and the firm do not know how well the worker’s
productivity fits the position. Both sides update their information on the current match
or potential alternatives during the employment relationship, which could lead to a quit
23The question is taken from the PISA study; compare e.g. Q22 in the 2009 questionnaire:
http://pisa2009.acer.edu.au/downloads/PISA09_Student_questionnaire.pdf .
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or lay-off. In our context, a mismatch would be revealed after some time of apprenticeship
and could therefore be responsible for dropout. A non-representative survey by Schöngen
(2003) reports reasons for dropout of apprenticeship which are based on information up-
dates of the apprentices. The prevalent reasons are conflicts with supervisors which arise
during the training or that apprentices become aware that the chosen occupation does not
meet their expectations.
Referring to the match quality approach, search strategy and search effort might mat-
ter for dropout risk. If the applicant’s search strategy is thorough, he might find a position
with a better match quality than otherwise. Besides, an internship prior to an apprentice-
ship at the same employer could reveal the quality of the potential match – for example
in having more information on the occupation – in advance and therefore lead to lower
dropout risk. We account for this with information both on the apprentices’ general search
strategy after leaving school and by the search channel via they have actually found their
apprenticeship position. We also have biographical information whether apprentices have
done internships, participated in programmes like occupational orientation courses or had
a job already before.
The empirical literature on apprenticeship dropout considers education a relevant
factor related to stability of the apprenticeship position (Bessey and Backes-Gellner, 2008;
Bilginsoy, 2007; Mangan and Trendle, 2008). A higher level of schooling leads to a lower
propensity to dropout. This reflects the general fact that better educated apprentices
are ceteris paribus less likely to dropout of training because their individual cost-benefit
ratio implies higher returns to education. We therefore take into account the apprentices
educational degree and their marks in German and Math.
There is some evidence that dropout is related to the state of the regional labour
market. According to Card and Lemieux (2001), higher regional unemployment rates lead
to a decrease of dropout rates from high school. Bessey and Backes-Gellner (2008) do not
find a significant effect of regional unemployment rates on dropout of apprenticeship. Our
analysis includes a regional indicator whether the place of residence is in West or East
Germany.
Empirical education economics highlights “soft skills” as driving factors for a successful
start into working life. In our case, drop out is likely to be driven by such factors, e.g. the
apprentices’ motivation, preparedness for working life, and the overall match quality with
the employers. Preparedness for working life could, as an example, indicate a specific abil-
ity to attain an apprenticeship degree. The apprentices have influence on match quality
by their personal occupational orientation and career ambitions. All these factors are typ-
ically unobserved. In this study, we use biographical information on apprentices’ activities
after they have left school and before they started apprenticeship. This information serves
as a proxy for the apprentices’ motivation, preparedness and abilities to successfully pass
apprenticeship training.
Empirical literature on educational outcomes or educational attainment is concerned
with the influence on unobservable categories like motivation and ability (e.g. Heckman
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et al., 2006). We suspect that motivation and ability are likely to influence dropout. The
presumption is that the more able and the higher motivated apprentices are, the less
likely they are to drop out of apprenticeship. The biographical information on the search
strategy and search effort serves as a proxy for the apprentice’s motivation and ability
with regards to the achievement of an apprenticeship degree.
In our survey, we asked apprentices about the reasons why they have unsuccesfully
searched for an apprenticeship. On the one hand, these reasons reflect ability which is
specific to the position. Some of the apprentices’ applications were unsuccesful because
their grades were too bad or they could not compete with other applicants. On the other
hand, reasons reflect motivation and preparedness of young school leavers. Some of them
have not searched for an apprenticeship position after school because they could not decide
on an occupation or they did not want to work yet. Another reason why apprentices did
not apply for an apprenticeship position was further schooling. This could also be a signal
for higher ability and high motivation directed at educational attainment.
Ability and motivation are also reflected by the apprentices’ activities between leaving
school and starting apprenticeship. Applicants who have been travelling after the end of
schooling or have been inactive (leisure) could also be more motivated and determined
to complete their apprenticeship leading presumably to lower dropout rates. Our data
comprise information on the effort associated with searching for an apprenticeship position
which could reflect ability as well as motivation. We proxy search effort by the number
of written applications and the number of job interviews before starting apprenticeship.
Many applications or job interviews could reflect the motivation and commitment of the
apprentice. Motivated and committed apprentices are less likely to dropout. On the
other hand, many applications or job interviews could also reflect a selection of applicants
who have been rejected often at previous applications, and hence are less able or loose
motivation due to the experience of failure.
Based on the above discussion, we argue with respect to the outcome of monthly drop
out rates that the available information justifies an identification strategy based on selec-
tion on observables. Our data set contains a large set of covariates, covering characteristics
like motivation, effort, and biographical information of first-year apprentices.
4.3 Specification of the matching estimator
To control for the selection bias related to observable characteristics X, it suffices to
compare subsidised and unsubsidised apprentices on the basis of a one-dimensional index
known as propensity score p(x) (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). The propensity score
provides a one-dimensional representation of the conditional probability of treatment par-
ticipation, in our case participation in Apprenticeship Bonus. Using the propensity score
the conditional mean assumption between participation D and Y 0 is still valid.
To find the closest match for each participant among the non-participants, we ap-
ply kernel matching (see Heckman et al., 1997, 1998). Kernel matching estimators use
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Table 3: Summary on the distribution of the standardised bias before and after matching
before matching after matching
median 4.535 1.106
mean 6.483 1.379
std. dev. 6.440 1.217
pseudo R2 0.145 0.009
LR chi2 566.790 18.810
p>chi2 0.000 1.000
Computation of the standardised bias following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985).
a weighted sum of the non-participants’ outcomes to compare it with a participant’s
outcome. We trim the estimation sample by dropping participants whose propensity
score is higher than the maximum propensity score of participants (for the distribution of
propensity scores see 4). The contribution of each non-participant’s outcome depends on
the proximity of the propensity scores to that of the participant’s. The outcome of a non-
participant receives greater weight if the propensity score is close in terms of its distance
to the propensity score of the participant. To specify the weights of non-participants’
outcomes, we choose an Epanechnikov kernel function with a bandwidth 0.05.24
If the propensity score model is specified correctly, covariates that are relevant for
selection are balanced after matching. This means that, after matching each participant
to a group of comparable non-participants, observable characteristics X in the matched
samples should be balanced on average. Table 3 provides summary statistics on covariate
balancing before and after matching. After matching, the mean values of all covariates
show no significant differences between the group of participants and the non-particpants.
The mean standardised bias is reduced by 77 per cent.
Table 3 reveals that even before we match participants and non-participants, a sub-
stantial number of covariates are balanced. In this case a linear least square regression
(OLS) could be used. Still the matching approach has some advantages. Due to its
non-parametric nature we do not have to specify E(Y 0|X,D = 1) avoiding possible mis-
specification. It also permits the treatment effect to be heterogeneous in arbitrary form.
Lastly, we are able to only consider participants which face a non-participant with the same
propensity score. This allows us to compare only comparable individuals in an effective
way.
4.4 Estimation results
We estimate the difference of dynamic incidence of dropout from apprenticeship between
participants and non-participants. We therefore construct the outcome as a binary vari-
able, taking on a value of 1 if the apprentice drops out in t, and 0 otherwise:
24The Epanechnikov kernel function is optimal with respect to minimizing the asymptotic mean integ-
rated squared error. The bandwidth is chosen by the rule of Härdle (1991). Robustness checks which apply
the doubled and quadrupled value of the chosen bandwidth do not show different results.
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Y dt =
{
1, if dropout of apprenticeship in t
0, if still in apprenticeship in t
(3)
with d  (0, 1) and t  [1, 12] months since the start of apprenticeship training. There-
fore, a negative average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) indicates a lower monthly
dropout rate, i.e. a favourable impact of Apprenticeship Bonus on dropout risk. We
separatly estimate the ATT on the outcome for each of the first twelve months of appren-
ticeship as in Equation 1. As stated by Ham and Lalonde (1996) the monthly estimated
effects might be influenced by different patterns of dynamic selection among participants
and non-participants. To meet this objection we match the group of participants with
non-particpicants on the base of monthly specific propensity scores distribution. We thus
take into account that characteristics of apprentices who remain to be at risk to drop out
in a specific month might change with the duration of the apprenticeship spell.
Figure 1 presents monthly point estimates of the ATT. All point estimates are in-
significant. Thus, Apprenticeship Bonus has no significant effect on early apprenticeship
dropout risk. Estimated coefficients are below one percentage point, which is very small
from an economic perspective. Estimates are negative in the first four months, and turn
positive afterwards. This suggests that during the first four months after start of appren-
ticeship there is a favourable impact of Apprenticeship Bonus on dropout risk in each
month.
Figure 1: Effect of Apprenticeship Bonus on monthly dropout rates (average treatment
effect on the treated)
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Note: 95% confidence intervals, standard errors are bootstrapped with 500 replications.
One might be concerned that relevant factors on the firm level which might influence
both selection into Apprenticeship Bonus and dropout risk are not considered. This would
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be the case if firms selected themselves into Apprenticeship Bonus on the base of factors
which influence dropout risk at the same time.
From qualitative firm interviews we have a deeper insight into the selection process
associated with Apprenticeship Bonus. These interviews suggest that selection into Ap-
prenticeship Bonus is at least partly driven by firms. They decide to offer an apprentice a
position. Simultaneously to or before hiring, many firms look out for possible programmes
which offer financial or other support in association with an apprenticeship position.25 It
could be the case that firms who are more inclined to seek external support – and thus have
a higher probability to be supported – share similar characteristics opposed to other firms.
One relevant factor could be firm size. Larger firms could have more capacities to screen
support facilities and to manage the application process. Moreover, certain industries may
be more attached to external support facilities.
In the empirical literature, firm size is not reported as a determinant for dropout. From
representative firm interviews, we know that larger firms are less likely to apply for Ap-
prenticeship Bonus. However, according to the literature, this is not a relevant factor for
dropout. Furthermore, as we have seen in Section 3, there are no differences in the chosen
occupations between subsidised and unsubsidised apprentices. This indicates that occu-
pational and therefore sectoral aspects are not relevant for selection into Apprenticeship
Bonus.
We argue that if there is remaining unobserved selection on the firm level, then this is
likely to be positive selection of firms with respect to dropout risk. As stated above, firms
that participate in the Apprenticeship Bonus have to meet an additionality criterion. The
position of the subsidised apprentice has to be additional, so that the current sum of offered
apprenticeship position has to be more than the average amount of apprenticeship positions
offered during the last three years. The fact that the number of apprenticeship positions in
firms has been increasing over the last three years is likely to reflect an increasing economic
development of the firm. Such firms are presumably more able to invest in training and to
provide a stable apprenticeship position. Following our assumption on positive selection,
our results can be seen as an upper bound of the effect of Apprenticeship Bonus on
dropout risk, and we can conclude that Apprenticeship Bonus at best has no effects on
early dropout risk.
To check the robustness of this argument, we simulate an unobserved factor of positive
selection (as suggested by Rosenbaum, 2002) and test whether and how this unobserved
factor influences our estimated effects.26 With the simulated unobserved factor turning
positive, the test statistics attest that is is unlikely for the effects to become positive for
months 5 to 12. For months 1 to 4, the likelihood is higher: the test statistics indicate
that by more than doubling the odds ratios, the effects tend to turn negative. Thus, our
robustness check under the assumption of positive selection supports our main finding
25As the provision of an apprenticeship position is in public interest, support is often provided by public
facilities.
26This robustness check is explained in detail in Becker and Caliendo (2007). For binary outcomes, the
procedure builds on the Mantel and Haenszel (1959) statistic.
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that the Apprenticeship Bonus does not have a positive effect on early dropout risk.
Despite the strong incentives for employers provided by Apprenticeship Bonus, we do
not find significant effects on the dropout risk. The reason why the firm subsidy has no
effect could be that, in almost half of the cases, it is the apprentice’s initiative to dropout
of apprenticeship training (Table 8). The reasoning of this result could be either that
firms have little influence on the individual decision to dropout. Furthermore, it could be
that the subsidy is a pure windfall gain for firms which do not react to the incentive as
predicted by theory. In that case the Apprenticeship Bonus causes an inefficient allocation
due to deadweight loss.
5 Conclusion
In this study we analyse the effect of the Apprenticeship Bonus on dropout of appren-
ticeship training. One aim of the programme is to support disadvantaged apprentices to
complete apprenticeship training. The programme provides a subsidy to the employer if
the eligible apprentices do not dropout during a specific period. The subsidy is split into
two equal parts. The first part is paid after completing the probationary period and the
second part is paid after apprentice’s registration for final examination. Only young people
who searched for apprenticeship positions unsuccessfully directly after leaving school are
eligible for the Apprenticeship Bonus. We describe the characteristics of apprentices who
have unsuccessfully searched for an apprenticeship position directly after leaving school.
Subsidised apprentices differ from unsubsidised apprentices, but a stereotypical character-
isation is not given. In the next step, we calculate the effect of the Apprenticeship Bonus
on early apprenticeship dropout.
The subsidy provided by the Apprenticeship Bonus should enter the cost-benefit con-
siderations of employers for entitled apprentices. As the Apprenticeship Bonus is split
into two payments over the course of apprenticeship training, firms ceteris paribus have
an incentive to prevent subsidised apprentices from dropping out during their appren-
ticeship. Even though apprenticeship wages are quasi fixed through collective bargaining
agreements and the subsidy is paid directly to the firm, we argue that incentives from the
subsidy are passed to the subsidized apprentices. Rational, profit maximising employers
should share the rent and provide monetary or non-monetary transfers to the subsidised
apprentices in terms of commitment, patience, concession, encouragement, or better work-
ing conditions. Subsidised apprentices should consequently be less likely to dropout than
comparable unsubsidised apprentices.
We use data from the evaluation of the Apprenticeship Bonus conducted for the Ger-
man Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. The data contain information on ap-
prentices who are subsidised by Apprenticeship Bonus and apprentices who are eligible but
not subsidised. The data comprise comprehensive information on the apprentices’ char-
acteristics, education, socio-economic and family background. It covers also biographical
information on activities and decisions concerning education and labour market between
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leaving school and the start of apprenticeship training. We observe variables which are
closely related to characteristics that are normally not available for researchers such as
motivation and effort. For the estimation of the effects of Apprenticeship Bonus we build
on our data and apply a selection-on-observables approach.
We estimate the effect of the Apprenticeship Bonus on dropout risk for the first twelve
months after the start of apprenticeship training. The pattern of the monthly treatment
effects is in line with the incentive structure of the subsidy. During the probationary
period, the effect on dropout is negative which means the subsidy points to a prevention
of dropout in this period. Afterwards, the effect turns positive. However, none of the
point estimates is significant. Therefore, we conclude that Apprenticeship Bonus has no
effect on early dropout of apprenticeship.
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Figures and tables
Table 4: Most frequent occupations chosen among participants and non-participants
rank occupations among
participants
percentage
share
occupations among
non-participants
percentage
share
1 office clerk 7.8% merchant 7.3%
2 merchant 7.6% office clerk 6.5%
3 hairdresser 5.8% salesperson 5.5%
4 salesperson 4.9% motor car technician 3.5%
5 motor car technician 4.5% hairdresser 3.3%
Note: Columns two and four show the ranked occupations among participants and non-participants.
Columns three and five show the respective shares of these occupations within the group of participants
or non-participants. Data is weighted
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Table 5: Differences in mean between participants and non-participants
mean value
parti-
cipants
mean value
non-
particip-
ants t-values
educational, social, and economic
background
secondary education
lower secondary degree 0.53 0.34 9.95
intermediate secondary degree 0.37 0.42 -2.43
higher secondary degree 0.07 0.21 -12.82
German grade 3.03 2.90 3.68
Maths grade 3.03 3.05 -0.55
socio-economic and family background
differences
disability 0.01 0.03 -4.03
migration background 0.12 0.09 2.25
financial problems or debts 0.14 0.10 2.70
psychological or addiction problems 0.05 0.06 -2.10
recipients of social benefits 0.17 0.15 1.12
having a boy-/girlfriend 0.33 0.32 0.50
living with parents 0.74 0.74 0.15
search strategy
number of applications 35.56 42.05 -2.88
number of job interviews 5.90 6.70 -2.18
applications were not succesful 0.48 0.46 0.94
another applicant was favoured 0.31 0.36 -1.37
grades were not good enough 0.38 0.33 1.61
sent applications too late 0.10 0.10 0.01
job search channels
newspaper advertisement/internet 0.770 0.810 -2.64
contact to former employer 0.550 0.480 3.62
inquiry at the employment agency 0.790 0.870 -4.90
job fairs 0.340 0.390 -2.76
employer offered position 0.450 0.340 5.84
labour market status after three months
in initial apprenticeship 0.980 0.960 2.43
jobbing/new apprenticeship/internship 0.000 0.000 -0.37
jobless, seeking work 0.010 0.020 -0.96
further training, military/alternative
service 0.000 0.010 -1.65
exit from labour market 0.000 0.010 -2.45
labour market status after six months
in initial apprenticeship 0.940 0.920 2.09
jobbing/new apprenticeship/internship 0.000 0.010 -2.60
jobless, seeking work 0.040 0.040 -0.76
further training, military/alternative
service 0.020 0.020 -0.83
exit from labour market 0.010 0.010 -1.20
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Differences (continued)
mean value
parti-
cipants
mean value
non-
participants t-values
labour market status after twelve months
in initial apprenticeship 0.880 0.870 0.27
jobbing/apprentice/internship 0.030 0.030 -0.54
jobless, seeking work 0.070 0.050 1.59
further training, military/alternative
service
0.020 0.020 -1.50
exit from labour market 0.010 0.020 -1.59
biography since leaving school
time between school and
apprenticeship (months)
32.05 27.61 4.16
further schooling/evening classes 0.090 0.060 2.73
vocational school 0.400 0.340 2.80
basic vocational education year (BGJ) 0.220 0.120 5.85
job preparing year (BVJ) 0.210 0.200 0.50
basic training (EQ/EQJ) 0.170 0.160 0.87
job preparing training (BvB) 0.250 0.290 -2.38
job application training 0.330 0.290 2.17
occupational orientation course 0.110 0.120 -0.75
language course 0.010 0.030 -3.96
temporary extra job (employment
agency)
0.060 0.050 0.88
other measures provided by
employment agency
0.030 0.020 0.40
longer internship (several weeks) 0.510 0.490 1.41
shorter internship (several days) 0.400 0.340 3.08
started different apprenticeship 0.230 0.240 -0.43
jobbing 0.490 0.440 2.36
military or compulsory community
service
0.090 0.100 -1.31
volunteer work 0.040 0.050 -1.43
more than 4 weeks vacation 0.180 0.180 -0.09
more than 4 weeks abroad 0.070 0.060 0.06
done nothing for a while 0.450 0.450 -0.24
searched for
apprenticeship/employment
0.770 0.780 -0.45
Note: Column one depicts mean values among subsidized apprentices, column two depicts mean values
among still eligible but unsubsidised apprentices. We conduct a two-sample mean-comparison test. The
third column shows the respective t-values. Data is weighted.
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Table 7: Destination of apprentices who dropped out
percentage of
participants
percentage of
non-
participants t-value
after three months
working, another
apprenticeship, internship 8.4% 6.4% 0.23
unemployed, searching for
work 65.0% 50.6% 1.05
further education,
military-/civil service 19.3% 24.4% -0.45
not related to the labour
market 7.4% 18.3% -1.39
after six months
working, another
apprenticeship, internship 4.0% 10.9% -1.93
unemployed, searching for
work 56.9% 49.3% 0.94
further education,
military-/civil service 26.8% 25.3% 0.21
not related to the labour
market 12.3% 14.6% -0.42
after twelve months
working, another
apprenticeship, internship 22.2% 24.3% -0.46
unemployed, searching for
work 54.1% 40.4% 2.43
further education,
military-/civil service 13.7% 19.7% -1.48
not related to the labour
market 10.0% 15.6% -1.56
Note: Column two and column three show the percentage among subsidised and unsubsidised apprentices
who dropped out, respectively. The table distinguishes three time points: three months, six months and
twelve months after apprenticeship has started. The figures denote the status at three months, six
months and twelves months after apprenticeship has started for the group of apprentices who dropped
out until three months, until six months, and until twelve months, respectively. We conduct a two-sample
mean-comparison test for each category. The third column shows t-values. Data is weighted.
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Table 8: Initiative to dropout of apprenticeship
Initiation to dropout of apprenticeship by ...
mean value
parti-
cipants
mean value
non-
participants t-value
the apprentice 46% 46% 0.09
the firm 22% 32% -2.58
both in mutual consent 17% 15% 0.56
firm closure 9% 5% 1.92
The apprenticeship was not aborted, but
finished. 1% 1% 0.29
did not answer 5% 1%
100% 100%
Note: Column one depicts mean values among subsidised apprentices, column two depicts mean values
among still eligible but unsubsidised apprentices. We conduct a two-sample mean-comparison test. The
third column shows the respective t-values.
Table 9: Reasons for dropout of apprenticeship
mean value
parti-
cipants
mean value
non-
participants t-value
general conditions
unfavourable location of apprenticeship 5% 7% -0.7
unfavourable working hours 12% 6% 1.4
wage too low 3% 11% -2.94
lack of support by the firm 9% 6% 0.91
personal preferences
no interest in apprenticeship 8% 7% 0.14
occupation did not meet expectations 18% 18% 0.11
conflicts with colleagues/supervisor 34% 23% 1.68
found or prospective different
job/apprenticeship/ treatment 3% 7% -1.5
other personal reasons 5% 4% 0.44
health
health problems due to apprenticeship 12% 6% 1.47
health problems unrelated to apprenticeship 1% 8% -3.41
own accomplishments
apprenticeship was too easy/difficult 2% 5% -1.33
Note: Column one depicts mean values among subsidised apprentices, column two depicts mean values
among still eligible but unsubsidised apprentices. We conduct a two-sample mean-comparison test. The
third column shows the respective t-values. Data is weighted.
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Table 10: Cumulative failure and monthly hazard rates among participants and non-
participants
Monthly interval Number of
observations
Cum. Failure Std. Error Hazard Std. Error
w/o Apprenticeship Bonus
1 2 3200 0.014 0.002 0.014 0.002
2 3 3156 0.033 0.003 0.020 0.003
3 4 3095 0.055 0.004 0.024 0.003
4 5 3023 0.068 0.005 0.014 0.002
5 6 2981 0.077 0.005 0.009 0.002
6 7 2955 0.088 0.005 0.013 0.002
7 8 2918 0.095 0.005 0.007 0.002
8 9 2897 0.100 0.005 0.006 0.001
9 10 2881 0.107 0.006 0.008 0.002
10 11 2859 0.115 0.006 0.010 0.002
11 12 2832 0.123 0.006 0.010 0.002
12 13 2805 0.133 0.006 0.011 0.002
with Apprenticeship Bonus
1 2 800 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.003
2 3 796 0.020 0.005 0.015 0.004
3 4 784 0.040 0.007 0.021 0.005
4 5 768 0.049 0.008 0.009 0.004
5 6 761 0.061 0.009 0.013 0.004
6 7 751 0.073 0.009 0.012 0.004
7 8 742 0.084 0.010 0.012 0.004
8 9 733 0.090 0.010 0.007 0.003
9 10 728 0.100 0.011 0.011 0.004
10 11 720 0.111 0.011 0.013 0.004
11 12 711 0.126 0.012 0.017 0.005
12 13 699 0.143 0.012 0.019 0.005
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Figure 2: Survival rates in apprenticeship for participants and non-participants
Note: The graph depicts survival rates in apprenticeship for every month since apprenticeship has started.
The survival rates are estimated Kaplan-Meier survivor functions. The solid line shows survival rates
for apprentices without Apprenticeship Bonus. The dashed line shows survival rates for apprentices with
Apprenticeship Bonus.
Figure 3: Hazard rates out of apprenticeship for participants and non-participants
Note: The graph depicts survival rates in apprenticeship for every month since apprenticeship has started.
The survival rates are estimated Kaplan-Meier survivor functions. The solid line shows survival rates
for apprentices without Apprenticeship Bonus. The dashed line shows survival rates for apprentices with
Apprenticeship Bonus.
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Figure 4: Different distributions of estimated propensity scores for apprentices with and
without Apprenticeship Bonus
Note: The graph depicts from the centre line upwards the histogram of propensity scores for apprentices
with Apprentices Bonus. The graph depicts from the centre line downwards the histogram of propensity
scores for apprentices without Apprentices Bonus.
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